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Abstract
The problem of making predictions from theories that have landscapes of possible
low energy parameters is reviewed. Conditions for such a theory to yield falsifiable
predictions for doable experiments are given. It is shown that the hypothesis of cos-
mological natural selection satisfies these conditions, thus showing that it is possible
to continue to do physics on a landscape without invoking the anthropic principle. In
particular, this is true whether or not the ensemble of universes generated by black
holes bouncing is a sub-ensemble of a larger ensemble that might be generated by a
random process such as eternal inflation.
A recent criticism of cosmological natural selection made by Vilenkin is discussed.
It is shown to rely on assumptions about both the infrared and ultraviolet behavior of
quantum gravity that are very unlikely to be true.
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1 Introduction
Nothing so dates an era as its conception of the future
-Brian Eno
By a few years after the 1984 “string revolution” it was clear that string theory would
face an extreme version of the problem that philosophers call the problem of underde-
termination. This was because it was quickly realized[1] that perturbative string theory
would likely come in a vast, and perhaps infinite number of versions, generated by ex-
pansions around classical background geometries. By analogy with population biology,
the space of these theories was called the landscape [2]. Its existence may be called the
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landscape problem. Put briefly, this is the question of whether string theory or any theory
based on a landscape can nonetheless generate robust and precise predictions that could be falsified
by doable experiments, based on our present knowledge of physics.
This issue compounded an already critical issue, which bedeviled attempts to explain
the parameters of the standard models of particle physics and cosmology from a deeper
theory. This is the apparent fact that the parameters of the standard models of particle
physics and cosmology appear to be chosen to be in a tiny subspace of the space of pos-
sible parameters which allows the existence and copious production of long lived stars
as well as a complex chemistry[3, 4]. Indeed, both long lived stars and stable nuclei owe
there existence to highly improbable tunings of the parameters that give large hierarchies
of dimensionless parameters. We may call this the special tuning problem1.
A number of different approaches have been offered to the landscape problem and
special tuning problem. Some of them are based on one version or another of the an-
thropic principle[3, 4]. It is certainly true that in a weak form the anthropic principle
makes logical sense: it is merely the combination of a very speculative hypothesis with
some common sense advice. The speculative hypothesis is that the universe contains a
vast number of regions where different laws operate, or where different parameters of
those laws hold. The common sense advice is that selection effects have to be taken into
account when computing probabilities in such an ensemble. The problem with the an-
thropic principle in this form is that it is nearly impossible to see how its use could lead
to falsifiable predictions. The reason is that there can be no independent confirmation of
the speculative hypothesis about the existence of other universes. Therefor one is free to
entertain any assumptions about the ensemble of unobserved other universes that gives
a desired result. The poverty of this kind of approach has been demonstrated in detail
in [2, 5, 6, 7]. The arguments will not be repeated here, but it is worth mentioning that
every claim of a successful prediction based on the anthropic principle has been shown
to be fallacious. One common fallacy is to append to an already complete argument a
logically unnecessary statement about life and other universes. The argument remains
true but life had nothing to do with it. Another common fallacy is to rely on assertions
of typicality to convert extremely improbable outcomes to probable, where the notion of
typicality is flexible enough that a large number of different outcomes can be obtained.
For more details see [5].
Is there instead a possible explanation of the observed parameters of the standard
model that solves the special tuning problem and is checkable by virtue of its making
falsifiable predictions for doable experiments? It is not difficult to discover that there are
conditions under which this would be possible. These conditions are given in section 2.1
below.
Are there then examples of such possible explanations? One of them was proposed in
[8] and discussed in [9, 10, 2]; it has come to be called cosmological natural selection (CNS).
This proposal is briefly reviwed in section 2.2. The present status of the hypothesis with
1It might be called the anthropic observation but this is misleading as the issues is the existence of carbon
chemistry and stars, and not intelligent life, per se.
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regard to predictions made in 1992, as well as challenges offered since, is reviewed in
section 3.
Very recently A. Vilenkin has proposed an argument claiming to show that CNS is
false[11]. In section 4.1 I present this argument and in section 4.2 explain why it fails.
2 The motivation for cosmological natural selection
2.1 What is required for landscape theories to generate falsifiable pre-
dictions?
The original proposal of cosmological natural selection[8] was motivated by early indica-
tions that string theory would have no unique physically preferred vacuum but instead
have a vast number of equally physical solutions. The notion of a landscape, L of theories
was introduced by analogy to theoretical biology, where the term “fitness landscape” is in
common use. Reasoning in terms of a landscape of theories involves several structures:
• A space of fundamental theories or a parameter space of a single fundamental the-
ory, denoted the fundamental landscape, L. On L is an ensemble of “universes”
EL described by a probability distribution ρL, which may depend on a global time
parameter t. L is analogous to the space of genotypes in biology.
• There is a process that generates evolution in the ensemble, leading to evolution of
ρL(t) in t. There may or may not be an equilibrium distribution which is constant in
time t. It is helpful to put a metric or topology on L so that two universes are closer
if they have a better chance of evolving to one another.
• We need also the space of parameters of the standard model of particle physics,
which we will call P . This is analogous to the space of phenotypes in biology, as in
that case it is relevant both because it is what we observe and because it and not the
Lmay influence the evolution of the ensemble.
• There is a map I : L → P . The images of EL and ρL under I give an ensemble and
probability distribution EP and ρP on P . This map may, as in the case of biology, be
highly non-trivial. If, as is the case in biology and in the current models of the string
landscape, L is a much larger space than P we may expect that I is onto a large
region of P including the point that labels the parameters of the standard model pus
we measure.
In [2, 5] I argued that falsifiable predictions will be possible in a theory based on a
landscape if three conditions are satisfied:
1. The process M that generates the landscape leads to a probability distribution ρP
which is highly non-random. We assume as in standard uses of probability theory
that our universe is a typical (that is randomly selected) member of this ensemble.
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2. There will be observables Ai whose values in our universe are typical of those of the
ensemble specified by ρP . If so than the hypothesisM can be said in the context of
this scenario to explain the observed values of the Ai.
3. There must be further properties, Bi which have yet to be measured and which
are not constrained by anthropic considerations but which are true in almost all
universes in the ensemble EP defined by ρP . In this case the theory predicts that our
universe will have those properties.
In addition, a fourth condition is required if we want our theory to also solve the
special tuning problem:
4. To explain the special tuning observation the process that determines the evolution
of the ensemble EL at a point l ∈ L must be highly sensitive to the low energy
parameters at p = I · l. Otherwise, the process will not be able to generate uni-
verses preferentially in those regions of P that contain long lived stars and complex
chemistry. This is because those features are only found in universes where the low
energy parameters fall into narrow ranges.
Note that these conditions all refer to the space of parameters of the standard model.
Assuming only that I is onto a region of P containing pus we do not need information
about the fundamental landscape to test the theory. But given information about the map
I some tests of this theory may imply tests of the fundamental theory.
This is of course analogous to biology, in which many predictions could be made and
tested without knowing the details, or even anything about, molecular genetics. Indeed,
the use of biology as an analogue is suggested by the fact that evolutionary biology is the
single case in science where a landscape problem and a special tuning problem have been solved
successfully in a way that generated new falsifiable predictions. As argued in [2] this is probably
not accidental, hence it makes good sense to try to apply the schema of evolutionary
biology to cosmology.
The claim made in [2, 5] is that no landscape theory will be able to either produce falsifiable
predictions for doable observations or give a genuine explanation of the special tuning observation
if it does not embody conditions 1-4. This is a prediction about theory; I believe that so far,
in spite of intensive investigation of alternative landscape theories over the last several
years, it has stood up.
2.2 An existence proof for the argument
Of course it might be that there are no theories that satisfy conditions 1-4. In this case
we would have to conclude that landscape theories are incapable of leading to falsifiable
predictions. Fortunately there is at least one example of a theory that satisfies 1-4, which
is cosmological natural selection[8, 9, 10, 2, 5]. Its main importance is that it provides an
existence proof that landscape theories can make falsifiable predictions.
The main hypothesis of cosmological natural selection are as follows:
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• O The world consists of an ensemble E of universes, each of which is characterized
by a point x ∈ L and hence by a point p = Ix ∈ P .
• I. Black hole singularities bounce and evolve to initial states of expanding universes[12].
Hence there is a fitness function f on P where f(p) is equal to the average number
of black holes produced by a universe initiated in such a bounce transition, which
has parameters p.
• II.At each such creation event there is a small change in x leading to a small random
change of x in P . Small here means compared to the step size under which f(p)
changes appreciably.
Hence the ensemble E is updated by a discrete series of steps, in each steps one new
universe is created for each black hole in an existing universe. Under very mild assump-
tions for the fitness function one can show that after many steps the ensemble converges
to one in which almost every member is near a local extrema of f(p). Hence the theory
predicts that a randomly chosen member of the ensemble will have the following prop-
erty, which we may call the master prediction of CNS
M: Almost every small change in p from its present value either leads f(p) unchanged or leads
to a decrease in f(p). Since our universe can be assumed to be randomly chosen we conclude that
if the hypotheses made above are true, almost no change in the parameters of the standard model
from the present values will increase the numbers of black holes produced.
Note thatM is a property of type B as described in section 2.1 above. It implies further
type B properties, and these, as we will review shortly, become the falsiable predictions
the theory makes.
We may note that the theoretical evidence for the hypotheses of CNS have strength-
ened greatly since they were made in 1992. There is, to put it mildly, a far greater con-
sensus that string theory provides a landscape of theories[13]. And there is much more
theoretical evidence that both black hole and cosmological singularities bounce[14].
It is important to note also that the master prediction M refers to the observed low
energy parameters and not to the fundamental landscape of theories. This allows it to
be tested in spite of our ignorance about the details of the landscape and the map I be-
tween the landscapes of the fundamental theory and the low energy parameters. In our
present state of knowledge this is an advantage, for the same reason that evolutionary
biology could imply predictions that were successful in the absence of any knowledge of
the molecular basis of genetics.
Note also thatM refers only to local changes around the observed values of the stan-
dard model parameters. It is commonly asked why one cannot assert that the theory
predicts that the population is peaked around a global maximum of f(p). The reason is
that this requires some detailed knowledge of the properties of the two landscapes and
the map I which we do not have at the present time.
Indeed, the whole point of CNS is to demonstrate that we canmake genuine falsifiable
predictions from landscape based theories in the absence of detailed knowledge of the
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fundamental landscape. This was certainly the situation in 1992 when the theory was
constructed. Given more knowledge about the properties of the string theory landscape
gained in recent and future investigations, more may become possible. But the claim
remains that any such prediction requires the conditions specified above.
Finally, note how the fact that the probability ensembles generated are highly non-
random does work here to protect the theory from the kinds of ambiguities that plague
applications of the weak anthropic principle. In the AP case the theory generates an en-
semble which is random on L and P , within which a universe like ours is highly improb-
able. One must then add supplementary assumptions such as the principle of mediocrity
to pick our universe out of the tail of a distribution where it is very untypical. The result
is that the resulting claims tend to be highly dependent on the precise characterization
of the ensemble in which our universe is expected to be typical. As demonstrated in real
cases such as “predictions” for the cosmological constant, one can get very different pre-
dictions depending on which parameters are allowed to vary in the choise of ensemble in
which we are stipulated to be typical. This does not happen in CNS, because our universe
is assumed to be typical within the original ensemble generated by the theory there is no
use for a further principle of mediocrity. Hence, the master prediction M depends on
very little information about the landscape, but it is sufficient to yield precise falsifiable
predictions, as we will now see2.
3 Successes of cosmological natural selection
Cosmological natural selection would have done important work, even if it had been fal-
sified, because its main motivation, initially, was to provide an illustration that theories
can be formulated that satisfy the conditions given above for landscape theories that al-
low falsifiable predictions to be made. But it is remarkable that, at least to date, it has
been more successful than that, as it has survived falsification in spite of being vulnerable
to it by ongoing observations.
3.1 Explanations
CNS, if true, solves the special tuning problem mentioned above[8, 9, 10, 2]. It does so
because the production of massive stars, required for copious production of astrophysical
black holes turns out to require carbon chemistry. This is because the dominant cooling
mechanism in the giant molecular clouds where massive stars appear to form is radia-
tion from molecular vibrations of CO. Furthermore, the giant molecular clouds require
shielding from uv light from the massive stars which is provided by carbon dust and ice.
This is to say that CNS explains why the universe is tuned so that there are stars
and carbon chemistry. This is the only explanation ever offered for this fact that is not
2This is the answer to some comments at the end of Vilenkin’s [11]. The full argument with references is
in [5].
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anthropic-ie does not use the existence of life as a part of the explanation.
CNS also explains a number of other coincidences. One of these is that the Fermi
constant is in the narrow range required for supernovas to work.
3.2 Predictions
Three predictions have been published about cosmological natural selection[8, 9, 10, 2].
To my knowledge all of these so far hold up.
1. CNS implies a prediction that neutron stars are Kaon-condensate stars and that the
upper mass limit for neutron stars is Muml ≈ 1.6Msolar[15]. This comes about be-
cause the strange quarkmass can be varied to raise and lowerMuml without strongly
affecting the processes that lead to massive star formation and supernovas[8].
So far all the well measured neutron stars have masses between 1.3 and 1.45 solar
masses. There is one dangerous case of a neutron star in which imprecise estimates
give a range of masses which exceeds the prediction, but at less than one sigma[18].
2. CNS implies that inflation, if true, must be governed by a single parameter, so that
the inflaton coupling that controls δρ
ρ
also controls the number of efoldings N [8].
When this is true one cannot just increase δρ
ρ
to produce a large number of primor-
dial black holes, because the result is a lower value ofN and hence an exponentially
smaller universe which produces many fewer black holes overall. But in more com-
plicated inflation models the parameters that control δρ
ρ
and N are independent.
Hence, CNS predicts that the correct model of inflation must be the one in which
these parameters are anti-correlated as in the standard single field inflation.
So far the predictions of single field, single parameter inflation hold up very well.
3. Little early star formation. The explanation of the special tuning observation given
by CNS could be wrong is if there are channels for massive star formation other than
those presently observed, which do not require carbon chemistry[8]. But if this were
the case they might operate at high z when the abundances of carbon and oxygen
are much lower. In that case it might be possible to observe many more supernovas
at high z. These so far have not been observed[19].
It can be noted that these are the only predictions, falsifiable with current observations,
that have ever been made from a landscape theory.
3.3 Prior attempted refutations
There have also been attempts at refutations([20]-[23]) that, on examination, did not suc-
ceed because they rested on too naive analyses of astrophysical processes. These include
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variations of Newton’s constant, of the baryon density and of the initial mass function.
These are discussed in [2, 10].
Another objection has been voiced in conversation but not, I believe, in print[24]. This
is that eternal inflation (EI) and CNS cannot be both true because the mechanism of uni-
verse generation employed in EI would, if true, overwhelm the ensemble of universes
created. The reason for this expectation is the vast numbers of universes created with a
very short time scale in eternal inflation.
Before answering one should note that eternal inflation alone is fated to employ the
anthropic principle and some version of the principle of mediocrity if it is to solve the
special tuning problem. This is because the mechanism of eternal inflation takes place at
grand unified scales much higher in energy than the natural scales of nuclear and atomic
physics, hence they are insensitive to whether the distribution of parameters is friendly
to chemistry and long lived stars. Thus, it is subject to the problems analyzed in [5]
which show that it is unlikely to either solve the special tuning problem or be the basis of
falsifiable predictions.
But the assertion that CNS and EI are incompatible is simply false. First of all, both
mechanisms of universe generation may in fact function in our universe. The problem is
then how to pick the structured sub-ensemble generated by CNS out of the much larger
random ensemble generated by EI3. But this is easy, one just has to ask the right questions.
In a world where CHS and EI both function a property a universe will have is N , the
number of ancestor universes it has from black hole bounces. One can consider the sub-
ensemble in whichN is larger than some very largeN0. Let us call this sub-ensemble E
N0
L
.
We can posit that our universe is a typical member of it. The reasoning of CNS can then
be applied just to this sub-ensemble, and the master predictionMwill be found to apply
to it.
But is the assumption that our universe is in the sub-ensemble EN0
L
independently
checkable, and does its postulation weaken the emperical content of the theory? The an-
swer is that it does not because it is already assumed that the statistical reasoning used
in CNS is applied to the ensemble created by many generations of bouncing black holes.
This is logically equivalent to postulating that our universe is in EN0
L
. Whether that en-
semble is a sub-ensemble of a much larger ensemble generated by EI or any other random
process plays no role in the argument.
4 A reply to Vilenkin’s argument
Very recently Vilenkin proposed an argument which he claims falsifies CNS [11]. I first
introduce the argument, then explain why it is much weaker than may appear at first.
3As we just noted, one always has to define a sub-ensemble in EI because the ensemble EI generates is
one in which our universe is very atypical.
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4.1 Vilenkin’s argument
The basics of the argument is very simple and is as follows:
1. Experimental evidence points to the existence of a small cosmological constant, Λ0 ≈
10−122l−2P l .
2. Assuming, first, that Λ0 is unchanging throughout the lifetime of the universe, the
universe will after a few tens of billions of years, and for ever after, be described to
a good approximation by vacuum eternal deSitter spacetime.
3. Eternal deSitter spacetime has a finite temperature
T0 =
1
2piR
(1)
where R−1 = H =
√
Λ
3
is the deSitter horizon scale.
4. In thermal equilibrium there is a very small, but nonzero rate for eternal vacuum
deSitter to nucleate black holes by quantum fluctuations (For some observers this
will look like nucleation by thermal fluctuations due to the intrinsic deSitter tem-
perature). This has been computed by Ginsparg and Perry[25] and others[26] using
the Euclidean path integral to semiclassical order, and the rate to nucleate a black
hole of massM per volume and per time found to be
Γ =
1
l4P l
e
−
M
T0 (2)
This is maximized by a Planck mass black hole, for which the rate is
Γ|max =
1
l4P l
e
−
2piR
tPl ≈
1
l4P l
e−10
61
(3)
5. This is a very tiny rate. But because deSitter space increases its volume exponen-
tially there will be a time tN ≈ R 10
61 at which the first nucleated black hole is
expected to appear. Moreover given the exponential expansion, not too long after
that a great number of black holes appear. These will swamp any amount of black
holes produced by ordinary astrophysical processes.
6. Thus, as long as the universe is in the deSitter vacuum for a time of at least, say,
twice tN , and as long as the calculation of Ginsparg and Perry is reliable. The over-
whelmingly dominant contribution to black hole production up till 2tN will be spon-
taneous nucleation of black holes by the Ginsparg-Perry process. However, we see
from (1) and (3) that the number of black holes produced by any finite time after tN
is strongly increased by making a small increase in Λ0. Hence, given that the above
assumptions hold, the present universe is far from optimised for the production of black holes.
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7. Given this, the argument will hold in any landscape theory in which there are
metastable deSitter vacua with lifetimes long compared to tN . As tN is less than
the Poincare recurrance time, tP ≈ R10
120 it is expected that there will be vacua in
the string theory landscape that satisfy this[13].
4.2 Critique of Vilenkin’s argument
I have put Vilenkin’s argument in a somewhat stronger form than he did. In particular,
there is no reason to talk of infinite production over infinite time, it is sufficient for his
argument that there is a finite time after which the Ginsparg-Perry process dominates the
production of black holes. Indeed, if we accept the assumptions of their argument, the
conclusion follows.
4.2.1 Preliminaries
There are a few preliminary remarks that should be made. First, strictly speaking, what
the master predictionM implies is only that most parameters cannot be varied to increase
the number of black holes. If there were only a single such parameter, and all the rest of
them turned out to agree with M that would be a remarkable fact and one would be
tempted to still take the theory seriously. After all, in biology, real organisms are not
totally optimized, one can always find a few mutations that would increase their fitness.
But as we shall see it is not necessary to duck out of Vilenkin’s argument in this way.
Second, it is important to emphasize that all that CNS predicts is the behavior of small
changes in the low energy parameters, around our present values, pus. Vilenkin’s argu-
ment appears to fulfill this, as he needs only small changes in Λ to produce exponentially
large changes in the numbers of black holes produced at any finite time t >> tN . This is
indeed why the argument must be rephrased in terms of a finite time, because all infinite
ensembles have the same cardinality.
Third, while it appears at first that Vilenkin’s argument is safe from Planck scale
physics, where we expect it breaks down, this is not in fact the case. The ensemble (2)
that is produced is dominated by Planck mass black holes, hence it is dominated by pro-
cesses which are sensitive to the ultraviolet completion of general relativity. Vilenkin may
want then to insist only on the minimal production of black holes, given for the lowest
possible mass black holes, when RSch = R. The problem is then that tN is exponentially
longer, and is in fact equal to the Poincare recurrence time, tP ≈ R 10
120 at which no
member of the string theory landscape is expected to be stable[13]. This is to say that the
reliability of his argument is constrained by the fact that we expect new physics for both
ends of his spectrum, for bothM =MP l andM = R.
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4.2.2 The problem of extrapolating current laws over vast scales
It is important to note that Vilenkin’s argument is not a falsification in the sense of the
above discussion: a falsification is an instance in which a theory makes a prediction for
an experiment which, when done, returns an outcome that contradicts that prediction.
Instead what we have here is a purely theoretical argument. The above arguments in-
volve black holes that we have good observational evidence for. The Vilenkin argument
asks us to believe in a new mechanism of formation of black holes that-even under the
assumptions of the argument-will not result in even a single black hole being produced
till a span of time has gone on which is vastly longer than the present age of the universe.
Indeed, the ratio of the time scale to create a single one of Vilenkin’s black holes to the
present age of the universe is the same as the Planck time to the latter.
We know that the laws that govern the present cosmological scale are very different
from the laws that dominate on Planck scales. But even now there are great uncertainties
about the laws that govern both the cosmological scale and any scale shorter than 1017cm.
Vilenkin’s argument presumes that we can apply laws that govern presently experimen-
tally accessible time scales to scales 1060 times bigger. How likely is it that such reasoning
is reliable?
What is required to be stable over such vast changes of scale is the least understood
of the low energy parameters, which is the cosmological constant. If we had to pick out
the single parameter about which we expect revolutionary insights, it is this one. We may
then anticipate that new insights concerning the cosmological constant and the dark en-
ergy will be necessary as physics progresses and these are likely to affect the assumptions
of Vilenkin’s argument.
The actual fact of the matter is that more than 30 years after the standardmodel of par-
ticle physics was written down, we have no confident prediction for post-standard model
physics that may be operating at scales just a single order of magnitude higher in energy
than we have already probed. What accounts for the dynamical symmetry breaking in
the electroweak interactions and what determines the physical scale where it happens?
We really don’t know, it could be supersymmetry, technicolor, preon models, dynamical
symmetry breaking driven by top-antitop condensation, just to mention a few possibili-
ties. All we know is that presently none of these work very well, all of them, including
supersymmetry and technicolor, which are the most beautiful options, are pushed into
corners of their parameter spaces.
Certainly, we should not be surprised as it has hardly ever been the case that we could
extrapolate current laws more than one or two orders of magnitude before encountering
unexpected phenomena. But if we cannot reliably extrapolate current knowledge a single
order of magnitude how likely is it we can extrapolate sixty orders of magnitude?
Vilenkin might reply that point 7 above requires only that there be in the string land-
scape somewhere theories that satisfy the assumptions given. But this is in fact too strong,
for the reason that the master predictionM above is restricted to small changes in the pa-
rameter space P of low energy parameters. So even if there are points in the string theory
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landscape L that resemble the deSitter vacua for times larger than tN wemust showmore
to have an argument relevant for the truth of CNS (because nothing in CNS precludes
there being universes far from our present parameters in P which produce many more
black holes than our universe.) We must show that I−1 maps a small neighborhood of the
low energy parameter space P around pus to a region in L where deSitter vacua that are stable on
times longer than tD are probable.
This means that CNS makes a prediction, which is that the statement just put in italics
is not true of the real landscape.
4.2.3 Evidence of new phenomena already at the present Hubble scale
Another vulnerability in Vilenkin’s argument is that it requires that the framework of a
ΛCDM universe should be reliable for time scales up to tN . This means it certainly must
hold up to all presently observable scales.
In fact, we already have evidence that the ΛCDM model may be breaking down at
the present Hubble scale. While the predictions of inflationary cosmology, particularly
Ω = 1 and a slightly red spectrum of fluctuations are confirmed at scales below the present
Hubble scale, there is a list of anomalies that contradict the basic prediction of inflation
that near scale invariance, homogeneity and isotropy govern much larger scales. These
include not only the apparent lack of power on scales greater than 60 degrees[27], but also
the existence of large anisotropies for modes between l = 2 and l = 5, the so called “axis
of evil”[28], and the apparent fact that up to modes of l = 40 half the sky is hotter than
the other half[29].
These may all be shown to be problems with the data analysis or instrument (although
they are there also in the COBE data), but attempts to resolve them so far have failed. At
the very least, it can be said that the data points more to new,unexpected phenomena
at scales of our present Λ than it does to the continued extrapolation of current laws to
larger distance scales. Yet, to accept Vilenkin’s argument as likely requires us to continue
present laws another 60 orders of magnitude beyond that scale.
4.2.4 The dependence of Vilenkin’s argument to the choice of the infrared completion
of general relativity
There is indeed good theoretical evidence that our understanding of gravity and cos-
mology needs an infrared completion in the shape of modifications of general relativity
and/or quantum theory. These include first of all the need to both solve the cosmological
constant problem and account for the observed accelerating expansion. There are sev-
eral intriguing suggestions for such modifications which are under investigation[30, 31].
These include quintessence, a ghost condensate, new terms in the Einstein equations, a
role for higher dimensions, or of new non-local effects[31]. All of them can account for
the observed expansion as well as a cosmological constant.
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Indeed, the option of just adding a cosmological constant is also a modification of gen-
eral relativity motivated by the data. It is the simplest such extension, but it is far from
the only plausible one. From a theoretical point of view the cosmological constant is in-
deed the least likely of the possible extensions which account for the data because it offers
absolutely nothing in the way of either accounting for the new phenomena or explaining
the observed value of Λ0, whereas several of the alternatives do both. Moreover, by doing
so the alternatives have the great advantage of predicting new phenomena which may be
observed in future data.
But on any of the alternatives the calculations in Vilenkin’s argument would come
out differently because they predict an evolution for the universe on scales much larger
than Λ−
1
2 very different from that given by general relativity. Some of these are quite
radical, for example, a dissolution of local physics by a growing dominance of non-local
effects[31]. But others are quite conventional, for example in quintesssence models the
cosmological constant may simply decay in time to zero, well before the era of black hole
nucleation.
4.2.5 Problems with the use of the Euclidean path integral in quantum gravity
Even within the framework of general relativity and quantum field theory there are seri-
ous worries with the assumptions of Vilenkin’s argument. Two of these come from his use
of the Euclidean path integral to compute the nucleation rate for black holes in deSitter
spacetime.
The use of the Euclidean path integral to compute the thermal Greens functions in any
quantum system, including general relativity, rests on a prior assumption, which is that
the system in question has come to thermal equilibrium. But it is well known that the
gravitational degrees of freedom never reach thermal equilibrium[32]. It is not difficult to
show that once produced, the mean free time for a graviton, τ(t) to have interacted with
anything, measured at any cosmological time t always satisfies:
τ(t) > t (4)
The universe either recollapses before the graviton interacts or the universe dilutes so fast
it never interacts. Another way to argue this is to show that any region of the universe
dense enough to contain gravitational radiation long enough for it to interact and come
to equilibrium will have collapsed to a black hole before those interactions take place.
These calculations tell us that it is incorrect to assume that the gravitational degrees of
freedom come to equilibrium in any context where their dynamics is governed by general
relativity.
But the use of the Euclidean path integral with periodic imaginary time tI to compute
thermal Green’s functions rests on the KMS condition which assumes that the system is
in thermal equilibrium[33]. There is no justification for using it to study a system that is
not in thermal equilibrium4.
4This is also seen concretely in [34]
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This is not the only problem with the use of the Euclidean path integral in quantum
gravity. Its use, as proposed by Gibbons, Hawking, Hartle and others in the 1970s rested
on the assumption that one could compute amplitudes in Lorentzian quantum gravity by
doing the Euclidean path integral and then continuing the resulting amplitudes back to
Lorentzian time. But this assumes that the Euclidean path integral itself makes sense. In
fact, we know now that the Euclidean path integral does not define a sensible theory be-
yond the semiclassical approximation. This is because Euclidean quantum gravity above
2 dimensions has no critical phenomena that could be used to define the continuum limit.
This is shown using dynamical triangulation methods to regularize the path integral[35].
The results show that there is no way to tune the parameters of the Euclidean path inte-
gral above d = 2while taking the continuum limit in such a way that a large scale classical
spacetime geometry results.
On the other hand, there is recent evidence that the Lorentzian path integral for gen-
eral relativity can be defined directly in such a way that a continuum limit exists, and
such that the infrared behavior of the theory so defined is consistent with the existence
of a large scale classical spacetime geometry[36, 37]. This work explicitly shows that the
Euclidean path integral does not define a theory in the same universality class as the
Lorentzian path integral. This is by now welll understood in d = 2[36] and there is good
numerical evidence for this conclusion as well in d = 4[37].
This is an example of a general phenomena in quantum gravity which is uv-ir mixing.
Considerations necessary to define a theory in the ultraviolet do effect the infrared limit of
gravity theories. Another example of this is the requirement that the local gauge group,
whether Lorentz or deSitter, in a quantum gravity theory is quantum deformed[38, 39]
when the cosmological constant is non-zero. This can be seen in d = 3, 4 from several
different calculations. It is required also to make the Hilbert space defined on the hori-
zon of deSitter spacetime finite dimensional, so as to be consistent with the holographic
hypothesis[39]. This in turn affects the low energy limit of the theory for arbitrarily small
Λ. For example a consequence in d = 3 and quite possibly d = 4 is that the contraction of
the low energy symmetry as Λ → 0 is not the Poincare algebra but a quantum deformed
algebra: κ−Poincare[41, 42]. But this effect is completely absent in the semiclassical ap-
proximation Vilenkin’s argument refers to, hence that approximation misses phenomena
dominant in the low energy limit of the correct theory.
Do these conclusions affect the validity of the calculations of Ginsparg and Perry?
They certainly do because the evidence is strongly that the semiclassical approximation
they propose for the Euclidean path integral is not an approximation to the true behavior
of the integral. The reason is the dominance of infrared instabilities that invalidate as-
sumptions about the behavior of the path integral required for the calculation to be well
defined.
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4.2.6 The sensitivity of Vilenkin’s argument to the ultraviolet completion of general
relativity
Someone might object that the semiclassical calculations in question could not possibly be
influenced by such technical issues, because they are insensitive to the ultraviolet comple-
tion of quantum gravity. But it is easy to see that this cannot be the case, for the formula
for black hole nucleation, (2) is dominated by Planck mass black holes. So the ultraviolet
completion of the theory is going to have a strong effect on the resulting amplitudes. (This
is another example of uv-ir mixing.) Whatever form of quantum gravity we have confi-
dence in, we expect that there must be effects which make it impossible to form black
holes with masses greater than MP l. But these effects are not seen in the semiclassical
limit. This implies that quantum gravity effect, not captured by the naive semiclassi-
cal Euclidean path integral, which concern the existence and production of Planck scale
black holes, are going to have a dominant effect on the actual black hole production rate,
because the production of Planck scale black holes dominates exponentially in (2).
One way to see this is give a much simpler and more physical derivation of the rate of
nucleation of black holes in a thermal spectrum. At any temperature T << TP l there will
be a tail in the Planck distribution of quanta with arbitrarily high energy,
ρ(E, T ) = E−4
1
e
E
T − 1
≈ E−4e−
E
T (5)
But for E ≈ EP l we expect, using conventional special relativity, that the associated
wavelegth λ = E−1 will be inside its Schwarzchild radius. RSchw = 2GE and hence
collapse to a black hole. Hence, we expect from this hand waving argument a rate of
black hole production in a thermal spectrum of order
Γ ≈ E−4P l e
−
E
Pl
T (6)
which agrees with (2).
But this form of the argument is very sensitive to the form of the ultraviolet comple-
tion of the theory. For example, there are proposals that quantum gravity effects modify
the energy momentum relation so that there are no quanta of wavelength shorter than
lP lanck[40]. These are the so called double or deformed special relativity. We know in
fact that such a modification holds in quantum gravity in 2 + 1 dimensions coupled to
matter[41] and there are reasons to expect it holds generally[42]. In this case we would
have the Planck spectrum cut off by λ ≈ lP l. The result could easily be a complete sup-
pression of black hole production as that requires quanta with wavelengths λ ≤ lP l.
Note that if doubly special relativity is true, it is not an adjustable feature that can be
varied over a landscape. As shown in 2 + 1 dimensions, it is forced by the ultraviolet
consistency of the theory. If the same holds in 3+1 dimension than the result may be that
no theory allows thermal production of black holes at finite positive Λ5.
5To this must also be added the observation that the dominant population of black holes produced by
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These considerations are not definitive but they are sufficient to show that Vilenkin’s
argument is highly speculative. It is just possible that all these objections might be evaded
so that it hold in the true theory, but there are many reasons to suspect it does not. As
a speculative argument it is of interest, but as a claim for “falsification” of cosmological
natural selection it has little force because it is so unlikely that the assumptions it makes
are true at all, let alone apply to scales vastly bigger than the present Hubble scale.
4.2.7 Freak observers and the reducto ad absurdum of Vilenkin’s argument.
So far we have argued that it is not likely that Vilenkin’s assumptions are realized in na-
ture. But there is a final issue to bring up, which is that if Vilenkin’s argument works
against cosmological natural selection, it works also against many predictions of Dar-
winian biology. Here is a minimal prediction of Darwinian biology:
D Almost everyDNA sequence found in nature is found in the cells of a creature
that is capable of reproducing itself.
This is true in spite of the fact that almost every randomly chosenDNA sequence does
not code for any viable organism. Indeed, since DNA does not exist except on planets
with our kind of life, D and many other predictions of Darwin’s theory can be extended
to the whole universe. So Darwin’s theory can be seen as a cosmological theory that
makes many predictions about the distribution of objects in the whole universe, of the
form ofD.
Now, let us make the same assumptions as in Vilenkin’s argument[11], including that
the universe evolves to the eternal deSitter vacua. Due to its thermal flucutations there
is a small, but non-vanishing probability that a strand of DNA coding any sequence A
comes into existence spontaneously. We can estimate that the rate for this will have the
form
Γ(A) ≈ e−αm(A)R (7)
where m(A) is the mass of the DNA sequence and α > 0 is a constant we do not need to
estimate. Since deSitter spacetime is eternal after some time almost every DNA sequence
in the history of the universe will be made by this spontaneous process. Since Γ(A) is
insensitive to the viability or fitness of any organism D is wrong. By this schema one
could argue that virtually any prediction of Darwin’s theory is falsified once one accepts
the assumptions of Vilenkin’s argument.
Indeed, one could apply this reasoning to many predictions of science, because so long
as there is a non-zero rate for a disconfirming instance to appear by a spontaneous ther-
mal fluctuation, and so long as there are more disconfirming instances than confirming in-
stances, which is the case for most predictions of science, the disconfirming instances will
the Ginsparg-Perry mechanism evaporate almost instantaneously on the time scale, tN required to produce
them. This is very different from the astrophysical black holes involved in the original tests of CNS.Whether
this has an effect or not on the growth of the ensemble of universes is also a Planck scale problem, which
should be investigated if Vilenkin’s mechanism is to be further studied.
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predominate in a universe that approaches the eternal deSitter vacua. Therefor Vilenkin’s
argument could be used to discredit many predictions of science which up till now were
thought to be established.
Of course we can easily get out of this problem by arguing that we are misapplying
the principle of mediocrity. The predictions of Darwinian biology apply not to all DNA in
the universe, but only to DNA sequences which are created in the cells of living creatures.
Certainly this is correct. But if this is allowed we can make exactly the same move to save
the theory of cosmological natural selection. We can restrict attention to the ensemble of
universes which are created from astrophysical black holes. This evades Vilenkin’s argu-
ment and returns CNS to the status it had before. So, if we can save Darwinian biology
by restricting the ensemble under consideration to that created by biological processes,
we can just as easily save Darwinian cosmology by the analogous move.
It is remarkable that arguments of this kind have in fact appeared in the literature of
the anthropic principle and eternal inflation[43]. This is because applying the principle of
mediocrity requires making good on how to count the numbers of observers in a given
universe. But by an argument of the form just given, there is in eternal deSitter spacetime
an infinite number of brains that appear spontaneously by a thermal fluctuation. If they
are counted then almost all observers arise as spontaneous fluctuations in the eternal
deSitter vacua.
This is a problem for the principle of mediocrity because we are then not typical ob-
servers. Of course, one can then employ a version of the doomsday argument to predict
that the universe must be unstable so as to avoid the conclusion. But it is hard to see why
the same argument, once allowed, would not hold against eternal inflation, in general.
However, if one discards the early collapse of the universe as highly improbable, but
accepts the principle of mediocrity, then one can see the conclusion of the argument just
given as a proof that the assumptions of Vilenkin’s argument must be false. That is, given
that we are not “freak brains”, the principle of mediocrity and the assumption that the
universe evolves to an eternal deSitter vacuum cannot be both true.
Of course one could always try to take advantage of the freedom offered by the prin-
ciple of mediocrity to redefine the ensemble in which we are said to be “typical”. But if
we are allowed to do this, we can use precisely the same freedom to redefine the ensem-
ble considered in applications of Vilenkin’s argument to CNS, as discussed above. Thus,
either Vilenkin’s argument is wrong or it has no force against CNS.
One might have thought that reasoning of this kind, which takes advantage of the
flexibility built into the principle of mediocrity to choose the ensemble in which we are
“typical”, would be recognized as a reducto ad absurdum of a research program. Instead
there is in fact a literature about how the probability distribution used in application of
the anthropic principle to eternal inflation can be modified to avoid the problem of the
dominance of the class of observers by non-biological freaks[43]. But by employing such
a tactic, isn’t one just demonstrating that cosmological scenarios such as eternal inflation
that require some version of the principle of mediocrity to make our universe typical,
in a universe in which it is otherwise very untypical, are incapable of making unique
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predictions, because of the flexibility allowed by the ambiguity built into the notion of
typicality?
4.2.8 What the disagreement is about
The last considerations suggest that there is a deeper aspect to this disagreement. In
Darwinian biology we are not concerned with the far future, or what is eternally true,
we are interested instead in explaining the past and the present and making predictions
for the immediate future. Consequently we are concerned with relative fitness of nearby
configurations, we do not try to discuss what a maximally fit organism would be like. It
is the same with the application of natural selection to cosmology. Indeed, the application
of natural selection to cosmology only makes sense in a context in which the universe is
understood to be continually evolving to novel states at each time.
By contrast, eternal inflation and the anthropic principle appear to be an attempt to
restore a picture of the universe which is static, in which we are concerned not with what
is true at any moment in our particular universe, but instead with properties of an eternal
and static multiverse. In this picture, things which are true are not bound in time, they
refer instead to populations defined over infinite, eternal time.
This is a deep philosophical disagreement over how to approach the science of cos-
mology6. But what matters to science is only which is more successful and we will see
over time which philosophy leads to genuine predictions and explanations. My main
claim is that it is the time bound, evolutionary picture, which is best suited to the world
as we observe it, because what we observe is in fact a universe evolving continually in
time. By contrast, the main theoretical object one works with in eternal inflation and the
antrhopic principle is not a representation of what we observe, it is an entirely invented
eternal and static multiverse. To go from the properties of this invented ensemble to what
we observe in our universe one requires supplementary assumptions. The principle of
mediocrity is this supplementary assumption. Its role, as we have seen above, is to pick
out a distribution in which our universe is to be typical from an invented one in which
it is not. As such it is required, but once it is admitted, the theory becomes too flexible,
because there is an unavoidable freedom in choosing the precise ensemble within which
our observed universe is to be typical.
By contrast, CNS makes robust predictions in spite of our ignorance of details of the
landscape, because it postulates a single mechanism that creates a single ensemble within
which our universe must be typical. This is why, at least so far, CNS has been more
successful at making robust and falsifiable predictions for observations that are not only
doable but in progress.
All of this was anticipated by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, who
wrote in 1891,
To suppose universal laws of nature capable of being apprehended by the mind and
6For more about the philosophical and theological roots of this disagreement, see [2].
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yet having no reason for their special forms, but standing inexplicable and irrational,
is hardly a justifiable position. Uniformities are precisely the sort of facts that need to
be accounted for. Law is par excellence the thing that wants a reason. Now the only
possible way of accounting for the laws of nature, and for uniformity in general, is to
suppose them results of evolution[44].
5 Conclusions
How are we to explain the choices of the parameters of the standard models of physics
and cosmology? How are we to account for the observation of special tuning to values
that allow the existence of long lived stars and complex chemistry? And can these be
done in the context of a theory that makes genuine falsifiable predictions for doable ex-
periments?
It seems that there is no evidence for the existence of a unique unified theory which
gives unique predictions for the parameters. Indeed, there is increased evidence for the
existence of a landscape of string theories, as first postulated in [1, 8, 2]. Nor does the
anthropic principle offer much hope for a genuine explanation of the valued selected or
for new falsifiable predictions.
Instead, one can give conditions for a landscape based theory to succeed in generat-
ing falsifiable predictions for doable experiments as well as genuine explanations for the
choices of parameters not based on anthropic reasoning. These were reviewed in section 2
of this paper. Cosmological natural selection was originally introduced in [8] as an exam-
ple of a cosmological scenario that satisfies these conditions. To this day it appears to be
the only proposed scenario of theory based on a landscape of theories that does succeed
in making genuine falsifiable predictions for doable experiments. We discussed above
three such predictions, which remain verified by observations. CNS is also the only gen-
uine explanation for the choices of the parameters that solves the special tuning problem
without resorting to anthropic reasoning.
After reviewing the status of CNS we discussed a very recent criticism of it proposed
by Vilenkin. We first strengthened Vilenkin’s argument, so as to make it not dependent
on reasoning about infinite quantities. Then we showed why the reasoning involved is
unlikely to be reliable. The reasons included,
• The Vilenkin argument requires that there be no novel physical phenomena other
than a simple cosmological constant when physics is extrapolated sixty orders of
magnitude beyond presently observable scales. But there are already indications in
CMB data that new physics is required at the present Hubble scale.
• The Vilenkin argument only works in a single one of several modifications of gen-
eral relativity motivated by the observation of accelerated expansion. It would not
work in the others.
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• The Vilenkin argument relies on calculations using semiclassical methods in Eu-
clidean path integrals, vintage early 1980’s. These calculations appear to be semi-
classical but they are in fact exponentially sensitive to new physics at the Planck
scale because the production rates which result are dominated by Planck scale pro-
cesses. The results are then very vulnerable to modifications at Planck scales includ-
ing cutoffs and modifications of energy momentum relations at Planck scales that
would greatly suppress or forbid the production of Planck scale black holes.
• The use of the Euclidean path integral made by Vilenkin assumes that thermal equi-
librium has been established among the gravitational degrees of freedom. But there
are compelling arguments that thermal equilibrium is never reached for gravitons.
• The theoretical basis for believing in the reliability of such semiclassical Euclidean
calculations is also very much weakened by results that show that the Euclidean
path integral in quantum gravity defines theories in different universality classes
than the Lorentzian path integrals.
• The Vilenkin argument could be used against many successful predictions of Dar-
winian biology. To avoid this one takes advantage of the flexibility built into the
principle of mediocrity to restrict attention to DNA which is the result of biological
evolution. But the same move also allows us to restrict attention to the ensem-
ble of universes created in astrophysical black holes, thus making CNS safe from
Vilenkin’s critique as well as from the criticism that the multiverse may be domi-
nated by universes created in eternal inflation.
It is always good to challenge ideas with novel criticisms, and Alex Vilenkin is to
thanked for presenting a challenge to cosmological natural selection. But a careful look
shows that his challenge is based on assumptions that are not necessarily reliable, hence
the challenge is not very strong. CNS remains vulnerable to falsification, and so not only
is a viable cosmological model, it continues to illustrate the necessity of the conditions
stated in section 2.1 for making falsifiable predictions from a theory based on a landscape.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Hilary Greaves, Andrei Linde, Laura Mersini and Steve Weinstein for
conversations about these issues and to Sabine Hossenfelder and Alex Vilenkin for com-
ments on the manuscript. Research at PI is supported in part by the Government of
Canada through NSERC and by the Province of Ontario through MEDT.
References
[1] A. Strominger, SUPERSTRINGS WITH TORSION,Nucl. Phys. B 274, 253 (1986).
21
[2] L. Smolin The Life of the Cosmos, 1997 from Oxford University Press (in the USA),
Weidenfeld and Nicolson (in the United Kingdom) and Einaudi Editorici (in Italy.)
[3] B. J. Carr and M. J. Rees, 1979. Nature 278, 605; B. Carter, 1967. ”The significance
of numerical coincidences in nature”, unpublished preprint, Cambridge University;
B. Carter, 1974. in Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with Observational Data,
IAU Symposium No. 63, ed. M. Longair Dordrecht: Reidel. p. 291;
[4] J. D. Barrow and F. J. Tipler The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford University
Press,Oxford,1986).
[5] L. Smolin, Scientific alternatives to the anthropic principle,’, arXiv:hep-th/0407213, Con-
tribution to ”Universe or Multiverse”, ed. by Bernard Carr et. al., to be published by
Cambridge University Press.
[6] S. Weinstein, Anthropic reasoning in multiverse cosmology and string theory,
hep-th/0508006, Journal-ref: Class.Quant.Grav. 23 (2006) 4231-4236.
[7] L. Smolin The Trouble with PhysicsHoughton-Mifflin, 2006.
[8] L. Smolin, 1992a. ”Did the Universe Evolve?” Class. Quantum Grav. 9, 173-191.
[9] L. Smolin, On the fate of black hole singularities and the parameters of the standard model,
gr-qc/9404011, CGPG-94/3-5 ; Using neutrons stars and primordial black holes to test
theories of quantum gravity, astro-ph/9712189.
[10] L. Smolin, Cosmology as a problem in critical phenomena in the proceedings of the Gua-
najuato Conference on Complex systems and binary networks, (Springer,1995), eds.
R. Lopez-Pena, R. Capovilla, R. Garcia-Pelayo, H. Waalebroeck and F. Zertuche.
gr-qc/9505022; Experimental Signatures of Quantum Gravity in the Proceedings of the
Fourth Drexel Conference on Quantum Nonintegrability, International Press, to ap-
pear, gr-qc/9503027.
[11] A. Vilenkin, On cosmic natural selection, hep-th/0610051.
[12] J. A. Wheeler, in Blakc holes, gravitational waves and cosmology eds. Martin Rees, Remo
Ruffini and J. A. Wheeler, New York: Gordon and Breach, 1974.
[13] Shamit Kachru, Renata Kallosh, Andrei Linde, Sandip P. Trivedi, de Sitter Vacua in
String Theory, hep-th/0301240, Phys.Rev. D68 (2003) 046005.
[14] M. Bojowald, Living Rev. Relativ. 8, Irr-2005-11 (2005).
[15] G. E. Brown and H. A. Bethe, Astro. J. 423 (1994) 659; 436 (1994) 843, G. E. Brown,
Nucl. Phys. A574 (1994) 217; G. E. Brown, “Kaon condensation in dense matter”; H.
A. Bethe and G. E. Brown, “Observational constraints on the maximum neutron star
mass”, preprints.
22
[16] G. B. Cook, S. L. Shapiro and S.A. Teukolsky, ApJ 424 (1994) 823.
[17] S. E. Thorsett, Z. Arzoumanian, M.M. McKinnon and J. H. Taylor Astrophys. Journal
Letters 405 (1993) L29; D. J. Nice, R. W. Sayer and J. H. Taylor, ApJ 466 (1996) L87
[18] J. Casares, P. Charles and E. Kuulkers, The mass of the neutron star in Cyg X-2 (V1341
Cyg) astro-ph/9711236.
[19] Max Tegmark, Joseph Silk, Martin Rees, Alain Blanchard, TomAbel, Francesco Palla,
How small were the first cosmological objects?, ApJ, 474, 1-12 (1997), astro-ph/9603007.
[20] T. Rothman and G.F.R. Ellis, 1993. ”Smolin’s natural selection hypothesis”, Q. J. R.
astr. Soc. 34, 201-212.
[21] E. R. Harrison, THE NATURAL SELECTION OF UNIVERSES CONTAINING INTEL-
LIGENT LIFE, R.A.S. QUARTERLY JOURNAL V. 36, NO. 3/SEP, P. 193, 1995.
[22] J. Silk, Science, 227 (1997) 644.
[23] Martin Rees, in Before the Beginning, Addison Wesley (1997).
[24] Andrei Linde, personal communication.
[25] P. Ginsparg and M.J. Perry, Semiclassical Perdurance Of De Sitter Space, Nucl.Phys.
B222 (1983) 245.
[26] W.-Z. Chao, Int. J. Mod. Phys. D6, 199 (1997); R. Bousso and S.W. Hawking, Phys.
Rev. D59, 103501 (1999).
[27] C. J. Copi, D. Huterer, D. J. Schwarz, G. D. Starkman, On the large-angle anomalies
of the microwave sky, astro-ph/0508047, Mon.Not.Roy.Astron.Soc. 367 (2006) 79. Mar
Bastero-Gil, Katherine Freese, Laura Mersini-Houghton, What Can WMAP Tell Us
About The Very Early Universe? New Physics as an Explanation of Suppressed Large Scale
Power and Running Spectral Index, hep-ph/0306289, Phys.Rev. D68 (2003) 123514.
[28] Kate Land, Joao Magueijo,The axis of evil, Phys.Rev.Lett. 95 (2005), 071301,
astro-ph/0502237.
[29] Armando Bernui, Thyrso Villela, Carlos A. Wuensche, Rodrigo Leonardi, Ivan, On
the CMB large-scales angular correlations, 0601593; Dragan Huterer, Mysteries on Uni-
verses Largest Observable Scales, arXiv:astro-ph/0608318.
[30] There are many proposed cosmological scale modifications of GR, see, for example,
Gia Dvali, Predictive Power of Strong Coupling in Theories with Large Distance Mod-
ified Gravity, hep-th/0610013; Gia Dvali, Gregory Gabadadze, Massimo Porrati, 4D
Gravity on a Brane in 5DMinkowski Space, hep-th/0005016, Phys.Lett. B485 (2000) 208-
214; Justin Khoury, Fading Gravity and Self-Inflation, hep-th/0612052; Justin Khoury,
23
Amanda Weltman, Chameleon Cosmology, astro-ph/0309411, Phys.Rev. D69 (2004)
044026.
[31] L. Smolin, Generic predictions of quantum theories of gravity, hep-th/0605052; F.
Markopoulou, C. Prescod-Weinstein, L. Smolin, in preparation.
[32] L. Smolin, The thermodynamics of gravitational radiation, Gravity Research Foundation
award essay, second prize 1983, Gen. Rel. and Grav., 16 (1984) 205.On the Intrinsic En-
tropy of the Gravitational Field, General Relativity and Gravitation 17, 417-437 (1985).
Tony Rothman, Stephen Boughn, Can Gravitons Be Detected?, gr-qc/0601043, Foun-
dations of Physics, vol. 36, No. 12, 1801-1825 (2006); F. J. Dyson, Seismic Response of
the Earth to a Gravitational Wave in the 1-Hz Band, Astrophys. J. 156, 529-540 (1969).
[33] See, for example, LP Kadanoff, G Baym, Quantum Statistical Mechanics: Green’s Func-
tion Methods in Equilibrium and Nonequilibrium Problems, - 1962 - WA Benjamin.
[34] R. Holman, L. Mersini-Houghton, Why the Universe Started from a Low Entropy State,
hep-th/0511102.
[35] Jan Ambjorn, Z. Burda, J. Jurkiewicz , C.F. Kristjansen , Quantum gravity represented
as dynamical triangulations, Acta Phys.Polon.B23:991-1030,1992.
Jan Ambjorn, B. Durhuus, J. Frohlich, —it Diseases Of Triangulated Random Surface
Models, And Possible Cures., Nucl.Phys.B257:433,1985.
[36] J. Ambjorn, J. Jurkiewicz, R. Loll,Dynamically Triangulating Lorentzian Quantum Grav-
ity, hep-th/0105267; Nucl.Phys. B610 (2001) 347-382; A. Dasgupta, R. Loll, A proper-
time cure for the conformal sickness in quantum gravity, hep-th/0103186, Nucl.Phys.
B606 (2001) 357-379; J. Ambjorn, A. Dasgupta , J. Jurkiewicz, R. Loll , A Lorentzian
cure for Euclidean troubles, hep-th/0201104, Nucl.Phys.Proc.Suppl. 106 (2002) 977-979.
[37] J. Ambjorn, J. Jurkiewicz, R. Loll, http://arxiv.org/abs/hepth/ 0604212.
[38] L. Smolin, Linking topological quantum field theory and nonperturbative quantum gravity
J. Math. Phys. 36 (1995) 6417 gr-qc/9505028, CGPG-95/4-5, IASSNS-95/29; S. Major
and L. Smolin, Quantum deformation of quantum gravity, with , Nuclear Physics B 473
(1996) 267.
[39] L. Smolin, Quantum gravity with a positive cosmological constant, hep-th/0209079.
[40] G. Amelino-Camelia, Int. J. Mod. Phys. D 11, 1643 (2002); Joao Maguiejo
and L. Smolin, Lorentz invariance with an invariant energy scale, hep-th/0112090,
Phys.Rev.Lett. 88 (2002) 190403
[41] L. Freidel, J. Kowalski-Glikman, L. Smolin, 2+1 gravity and doubly special relativity,,
Phys. Rev. D 69, 044001 (2004) [arXiv:hep-th/0307085]; L. Freidel, E. R. Livine, Class.
Quantum Grav. 23, 2021 (2006).
24
[42] L. Smolin, Falsifiable predictions from semiclassical quantum gravity, hep-th/0501091.
[43] Alexander Vilenkin, Freak observers and the measure of the multiverse, hep-th/0611271;
Don N. Page, Is Our Universe Decaying at an Astronomical Rate?, hep-th/0612137;
Raphael Bousso, Ben Freivogel, A paradox in the global description of the multiverse,
hep-th/0610132; Andrei Linde, Sinks in the Landscape and the Invasion of Boltzmann
Brains, hep-th/0611043; DonN. Page, Return of the Boltzmann Brains, hep-th/0611158.
[44] Charles Sanders Peirce, The architecture of theories, The Monist, 1891, reprinted in
Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. J. Buchler. New York: Dover, 1955.
25
